Court
File No. C39988
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
IN THE MATTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY OF T.C.T. LOGISTICS
INC.,
T.C.T. WAREHOUSING LOGISTICS INC.
(and THE COMPANIES
LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A" HERETO)
AND IN THE MATTER OF AN INTENDED PROCEEDING
BEFORE
THE ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD
BETWEEN:
GMAC
COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION OF CANADA
Applicant
(Respondent in
Appeal)
- and -
T.C.T. LOGISTICS INC.,
T.C.T. WAREHOUSING LOGISTICS INC.,
KPMG INC., the Interim Receiver
and Trustee in Bankruptcy of
T.C.T. Logistics Inc. and T.C.T. Warehousing
Logistics Inc.
(and the Companies listed on Schedule "A" hereto)
Respondents
(Respondents in Appeal)
FACTUM OF THE INDUSTRIAL WOOD & ALLIED WORKERS OF
CANADA, LOCAL 700 (the
"Union")
(Motion for leave to appeal, returnable December
11, 2003)
PART I - NATURE OF
THE MOTION
1. The Union brings this motion for leave to appeal from the Oral Reasons
of Ground, J. dated April 29, 2003. Ground, J. dismissed the Union's motion for
leave to continue proceedings it instituted before the Ontario Labour Relation
Board (the "OLRB") against the Interim Receiver. for breaches of ss. 70, 72 and
76 (unfair labour practices) of the Labour Relations Act, 1999 (Ontario)
(the "LRA"), and a declaration that the Interim Receiver is a "successor
employer" or "related employer". Ground, J. also refused to delete paragraph 15
of the initial receivership order that states, inter alia, that the
Interim Receiver is not to be deemed a "successor employer" or "related
employer" under ss. 69 and 1(4) respectively of the LRA and other employment
statutes.
2. The Union submits that Ground, J. erred in refusing to grant leave and
not deleting paragraph 15. He also focused his entire decision on the "successor
employer" aspect and did not even consider granting leave to enable the OLRB
proceedings to proceed in respect of the breaches of ss. 70, 72 and 79 of the
LRA or the "related employer" applications under s. 1(4) of the LRA which also
form part of the Union's request for relief before the OLRB.
3. Ground, J. acted contrary to law by misinterpreting and misapplying the
applicable statutes and legal principles. His decision constitutes an abuse of
power and contains obvious errors for which there is no other remedy to the
Union but to appeal. Ground, J.'s decision permits the Interim Receiver to
breach provincial employment and labour statutes with impunity.
4. The Union states that the Interim Receiver breached the LRA because it
employed the employees of T.C.T. Warehousing Logistics Inc. to continue running
the warehousing business but did not pay the employees in accordance with the
terms of the Collective Agreement, in particular, failing to pay full vacation
pay, health benefits, make pension contributions to the pension plan and for
failing to provide termination pay when the Interim Receiver terminated the
employees on May 16, 2002 when the Interim Receiver sold the warehouse. The
Union asserts that the Interim Receiver became the successor employer or related
employer of the employees under ss. 69 or 1(4) of the LRA and is therefore
required to abide by the terms of the collective agreement.
5. Secondly, after operating T.C.T. Warehousing for several months, the
Interim Receiver sold T.C.T. Warehousing to Spectrum Supply Chain Solutions Inc.
("Spectrum"), a company founded by a former executive of T.C.T. Warehousing
(Gordon Crowther) on terms that stipulated that Spectrum not adopt the
Collective Agreement. Spectrum then moved the warehousing business to
Mississauga and currently operates the business without the Union servicing the
same clientele. The Union asserts that the circumstances of the sale were
manipulated by the Interim Receiver and Spectrum to eliminate the Union from the
Spectrum workforce and that the Interim Receiver thus breached sections 70, 72
and 76 of the LRA (unfair labour practices) which state:
70. No employer or employers' organization and no person acting on
behalf of an employer or an employers' organization shall participate in or
interfere with the formation, selection or administration or a trade union or
the representation of employees by a trade union or contribute financial or
other support to a trade union, but nothing in this section shall be deemed to
deprive an employer of the employer's freedom to express views so long as the
employer does not use coercion, intimidation, threats, promises or undue
influence.
. . .
72. No employer, employers' organization or person acting on behalf
of an employer or an employers' organization,
(a) shall refuse to employer or to continue to employ a person, or
discriminate against a person in regard to employment or any term of condition
of employment because the person was or is a member of a trade union or was or
is exercising any other rights under this Act;
(b) shall impose any condition in a contract of employment or propose the
imposition of any condition in a contract of employment that seeks to restrain
an employee or a person seeking employment from becoming a member of a trade
union or exercising any other rights under this Act; or
(c) shall seek by threat of dismissal, or by any other kind of threat, or
by the imposition of a pecuniary or other penalty, or by any other means to
compel an employee to become or refrain from becoming or to continue to be or to
cease to be a member or officer or representative of a trade union or to cease
to exercise any other rights under this Act.
. . .
76. No person, trade union or employers' organization shall seek by
intimidation or coercion to compel any person to become or refrain from becoming
or to continue to be or to cease to be a member of a trade union or of an
employers' organization or to refrain from exercising any other rights under
this Act or from performing any obligations under this Act.
6. This appeal raises very significant issues for stakeholders in the
insolvency practice in Ontario (and the rest of Canada) in respect of the
applicability of provincial labour and employment statutes in insolvency
proceedings where a receiver or trustee continues to employ employees to carry
on the business.
7. This court urgently needs to settle the law and give direction to the
bankruptcy practice. The current practice of Commercial List judges appointing
interim receivers by issuing lengthy, "boiler plate"-style orders on ex
parte motions that contain blanket exemptions for receivers (and trustees)
from the application of provincial employment laws (which, as the Court held in
Big Sky, infra, a court has no legal authority to do) leaves
employees vulnerable to abuse, such as what occurred in the case at bar, because
provincial employment laws need no longer be abided, collective agreements can
be ignored and pension plan contributions no longer made yet employee continue
to do the exact same job they were doing prior to the insolvency.
8. This is a proper and important case for a review by this Court. This
Court should grant leave to appeal. The circumstances of this case and the
breaches of the LRA by the Interim Receiver need to be adjudicated before the
OLRB which the Union presently cannot do without obtaining leave of the Court to
continue proceedings against the interim receiver.
PART II - THE FACTS
9. T.C.T. Logistics Inc. ("T.C.T.") was a conglomerate of companies, one of
which was T.C.T. Warehousing Logistics Inc. which operated a third-party
warehousing facility at 137 Horner Avenue in Etobicoke, Ontario.
10. The warehouse facility at 137 Horner Avenue was previously owned and
operated by Livingston Distribution Centres Inc. On or about November 1, 1998,
T.C.T. acquired Livingston and took over the warehousing business. The Union
had a collective agreement with Livingston effective from May 1, 1997 to April
30, 2000 and, following the acquisition, with T.C.T. Warehousing effective from
May 1, 2000 to April 30, 2004. The Union was therefore the exclusive bargaining
agent for the employees at the warehouse at 137 Horner Avenue.
Affidavit of Raymond Lewis, sworn October 22, 2002 ("Lewis Affidavit"),
Motion Record of the Union, Tab 1, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5.
11. In January 2002, T.C.T. became insolvent. On January 24, 2002, the
secured creditor of T.C.T., General Motors Acceptance Corporation ("GMAC")
applied to court under section 101 of the Courts of Justice Act (Ontario)
and section 47 of the BIA to appoint an interim receiver over all T.C.T.
companies, including T.C.T. Warehousing. Ground, J. issued an Order appointing
KPMG Inc. the Interim Receiver over T.C.T.
12. The motion was brought by GMAC without notice to most interested
parties and without notice to the Union or the employees. The Order appointing
the Interim Receiver is a lengthy, pre-drafted, "boiler plate" style order that
contains many provisions that directly impact the rights of the employees of
T.C.T., in particular, paragraph 15 which states:
15. THIS COURT ORDERS that the employment of employees of the
Debtors, including employees on maternity leave, disability leave and all other
forms of approved absence is hereby terminated effective immediately prior to
the appointment of the Receiver. Notwithstanding the appointment of the
Receiver or the exercise of its powers or the performance of any of its duties
hereunder, or the use or employment by the Receiver of any person in connection
with its appointment and the performance of its powers and duties hereunder, the
Receiver is not and shall not be deemed or considered to be a successor
employer, related employer, sponsor or payer with respect to any of the
employees or any of the Debtors or any former employees within the meaning of
the Labour Relations Act (Ontario), the Employment Standards Act
(Ontario), the Pension Benefits Act (Ontario), Canada Labour Code,
Pension Benefits Standards Act (Ontario) or any other provincial, federal or
municipal legislation or common law governing employment or labour standards,
(the "Labour Laws") or any other statute, regulation or rule of law or equity
for any purpose whatsoever, or any collective agreement or other contract
between any of the Debtors and any of their present or former employees, or
otherwise. In particular, the Receiver shall not be liable to any of the
employees of any of the Debtors for any wages (as "wages" are defined in the
Employment Standards Act (Ontario)), including severance pay, termination
pay and vacation pay, except for such wages as the Receiver may specifically
agree to pay. The Receiver shall not be liable for any contribution or other
payment to any pension or benefit fund.
Motion Record of the Union, Tab 4
13. In his decision of April 29, 2003 that is the subject of this appeal,
Ground, J. did not delete paragraph 15 as requested by the Union, but amended it
to insert the words "for the purpose of preserving, protecting and realizing the
upon the assets of the Debtors by effecting a sale or sae of the assets or of
the business of the Debtors as a going concern or otherwise or for the purpose
of effecting an orderly liquidation of the assets of the Debtors." after the
word "hereunder" in the seventh line of the order. That revision makes no
material difference to the effect of the order whatsoever.
14. After being appointed, the Interim Receiver did not tell the employees
of T.C.T. Warehousing that they were terminated, nor did the Interim Receiver
tell the employees that the receivership order contained a provision that their
employment was terminated. Instead, the Interim Receiver told the employees
that operations were continuing "business as usual" and asked for their
continuing support and loyalty. The memo provided to the employees
states:
This memo is to advise you that KPMG Inc. ("KPMG") has been appointed
Interim Receiver of T.C.T. Logistics Inc. and its affiliated companies by the
Supreme Court of Ontario.
At this time, it is the intention of KPMG Inc. to continue operations in
order to evaluate potential sales of various lines of business.
. . .
Your wages and payments to contract operators will be paid when due.
Legitimate expenses should be submitted as usual, for reimbursement. While we
appreciate that this will be a difficult time for employees and lease operators,
your loyalty and support during this period is important to allow us to maximise
the enterprise value for all stakeholders.
KPMG Inc. Guy Odhams, Marc Kelly and Darren Yausie
Memo from KPMG to employees dated January 24, 2002, Lewis Affidavit,
supra, Motion Record of the Union, Tab 1(C).
Supplementary Lewis
Affidavit sworn January 13, 2003 ("Supplementary Lewis Affidavit"), Motion
Record of the Union, Tab 2(A), paragraph 1.
15. The Union consulted with its legal counsel. On February 1, 2002,
counsel to the Union wrote to Guy Odhams, Marc Kelly and Darren Yausie of KPMG
and also to Donald W. Turple and Robert Linkilde, executives of T.C.T., advising
that it is the Union's position that:
• the Collective Agreement remains operative and in full force and
effect during the period of continued employment of the employees in the
warehouse; and
• if any sale of the warehousing business occurred, the purchaser is
to be bound by the Collective Agreement.
Letter from Stephen Wahl to T.C.T. and KPMG, dated February 1, 2002, Lewis
Affidavit, supra, Motion Record of the Union, Tab 1(D), paragraphs 2 and
3.
16. There was no response from the Interim Receiver or counsel to the
Interim Receiver to the February 1, 2002 correspondence from Union's
counsel.
17. On February 22, 2002, the Interim Receiver brought a motion for an
order authorizing it to file an assignment in bankruptcy on behalf of T.C.T.,
including T.C.T. Warehousing. Lax, J. issued the Order. The Union did not
receive prior notice of this motion and thus did not attend at the motion.
Order of Madam Justice Lax dated February 22, 2002, Lewis Affidavit,
supra, Motion Record of the Union, Tab 1(E).
18. On February 25, 2002, the Interim Receiver (and now also the trustee in
bankruptcy) told the employees that a bankruptcy filing had been made but that
operations were still continuing on a business-as-usual basis. In a memo to
employees, the Interim Receiver stated:
Effective today, T.C.T. Logistics Inc. and its subsidiaries have filed for
bankruptcy. This has no effect on existing operations and the ongoing sales
process.
Once again, we would like to thank each of you for your continued support
and co-operation.
Notice from KPMG to employees dated February 25, 2002, Supplementary Lewis
Affidavit, Motion Record of the Union, Tab 2(D), paragraph 5.
19. On April 12, 2002, the Interim Receiver/Trustee entered into a sale
agreement with Spectrum to sell T.C.T. Warehousing. The Asset Purchase
Agreement provides that the Interim Receiver/Trustee will terminate all
employees prior to the closing of the transaction, and that Spectrum would
re-hire certain non-unionized employees only. Section 2.2 of the Asset
Purchase Agreement states:
[O]n or before the Closing Date, the Vendor shall terminate the employment
or continued retainer of all Employees whose employment is not subject to the
terms of a Collective Agreement (the "Non-unionized employees") and shall
deliver notices of lay-off prior to the Closing Date to those Employees whose
employment is subject to the terms of a Collective Agreement (the "Unionized
Employees") and the Vendor shall be responsible for delivering notices of
lay-off in accordance with the terms of the Collective Agreements and applicable
law. All Non-Unionized Employees listed on Schedule "H" attached hereto will
be offered employment with the Purchaser on the basis that each
Non-Unionized Employee who accepts the Purchaser's offer of employment shall be
deemed to be a "new hire" of the Purchaser.
(Emphasis added)
Asset Purchase Agreement, dated April 12, 2002, Lewis Affidavit,
supra, Motion Record of Union, Tab 1(I), at 68.
20. The Interim Receiver received five offers from five different
interested purchasers and selected Spectrum.
21st Report of KPMG, December 30, 2002, para. 46
21. According to the sale agreement, Spectrum would continue the
warehousing business at a new location in Mississauga, not at 137 Horner Avenue.
The 137 Horner Avenue warehouse therefore needed to be shut down. The Interim
Receiver then retained Spectrum to manage the wind down of the warehousing
operations at 137 Horner Avenue and move the business to Mississauga. The Union
asserts that the Interim Receiver/Trustee and Spectrum manipulated the move of
the warehousing business to Mississauga to deliberately circumvent the
application of the Collective Agreement which is clearly location-specific to
the 137 Horner Avenue warehouse. Such manipulation is a contravention of
sections 70, 72 and 76 of the LRA.
Notice to Employees dated April 16, 2002, Lewis Affidavit, supra,
Motion Record of the Union, Tab 1(F), para. 2.
22. The sale agreement between KPMG and Spectrum was executed on April 12,
2002. KPMG did not tell the employees until April 16, 2002 that T.C.T.
Warehousing had been sold and that it would be seeking court approval of the
sale two days later. Counsel to the Union was not given notice of the
sale nor of the court motion scheduled for April 18, 2002 for approval of the
sale, which would have been short service under the Rules of Civil
Procedure in any event. Without any knowledge of the sale or the motion,
counsel to the Union did not attend the motion. The motion proceeded
unbeknownst to counsel to the Union before Greer, J. who on April 19, 2002
issued an Order approving the sale. The speed of seeking court approval
combined with the lack of notice to Union's counsel combined so that the
offensive terms of the sale ousting the Union only became known to the Union and
Union's counsel after the sale had been approved by the court.
Lewis Affidavit, supra, Motion Record of the Union, Tab 1, para.
10.
Twenty-First Report of KPMG, December 30, 2002.
23. Having concluded the sale of the warehouse to Spectrum, on May 9, 2002
the Interim Receiver announced for the first time that all unionized employees
at the 137 Horner Avenue location would be terminated as of May 16, 2002.
Supplementary Lewis Affidavit, supra, Motion Record of Union, Tab 2,
para. 2.
24. Spectrum subsequently handpicked and hired a number of managers and
certain, formerly unionized employees from the 137 Horner Avenue warehouse to
work at the new Mississauga warehouse, without any regard to the Collective
Agreement or the Union seniority list. Spectrum operates the same business as
T.C.T. Warehousing without the Union and has set up operations at 6099
McLaughlin Road in Mississauga, Ontario, serving essentially the same clientele
as T.C.T. Warehousing. The President of Spectrum is Gordon Crowther, a former
executive of T.C.T. who is fully aware that the warehouse employees at 137
Horner Avenue were unionized.
Lewis Affidavit, supra, Motion Record of the Union, para. 13.
25. It is the Union's submission that the sale to Spectrum was clearly
manipulated by the Interim Receiver/Trustee and Spectrum to eliminate the Union.
The sale has resulted in the loss of jobs for all unionized employees at the 137
Horner Avenue location (except for those few later hand-picked by Spectrum) and
the elimination of the Union from the workforce of Spectrum.
26. Upon learning of the terms of the sale that operate to oust the Union
from the Spectrum warehouse, the Union immediately instructed its counsel to
file applications with the OLRB against the Interim Receiver/Trustee and
Spectrum for, inter alia, breaches of sections 70, 72 and 76 of the OLRA.
The Union also filed applications with the OLRB seeking a declaration that the
Interim Receiver and/or Spectrum is the "successor employer" and/or "related
employer" pursuant to sections 69 and 1(4) of the LRA, and an Order for the
certification of the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent for the employees
of the Spectrum warehouse. The application was filed on May 13, 2002.
27. The OLRB hearings proceeded on July 2, 2002. On August 27, 2002, the
Board released its decision and held that it could not hear the applications
because leave of the Court must be first obtained under the initial receivership
order for applications against the Interim Receiver. The Union subsequently
brought a motion before Ground, J. on October 24, 2002 for such leave, an order
to delete the requirement to post security for costs, and an order to delete
paragraph 15 of the Order. The motion was heard on January 23 and 24, 2003.
Ground, J. released his Oral Reasons on April 29, 2003.
Decision of O.L.R.B. dated August 27, 2002, Lewis Affidavit, supra,
Motion Record of the Union, Tab 1(M).
28. In his Oral Reasons, Ground, J. did not grant leave, and refused to
even consider the applicable tests for leave. Ground, J. did not delete
paragraph 15 from the receivership order immunizing the Interim Receiver and
concluded that as a result, any hearing before the OLRB would be moot.
29. On May 9, 2003, the Union served a Notice of Appeal to this Court of
Ground, J.'s Oral Reasons. The Union perfected its appeal on July 16, 2003 and
a date for the appeal hearing was set by the Registrar of this Court for January
28, 2004. The Interim Receiver/Trustee has not filed any responding materials
to date.
30. On October 31, 2003, the Interim Receiver/Trustee brought a motion
before a panel of this Court to quash the appeal. This Court did not quash but
stayed the appeal, and directed the Union to seek leave to appeal before a
single judge.
Endorsements of the Ontario Court of Appeal, October 31, 2003 (O'Connor,
A.C.J.O., Moldaver, Gillese J.J.A.), Motion Record of the Union, Tab 3
PART III - ISSUES AND THE LAW
The Test for Leave to Appeal
31. The test for leave to appeal under the s. 193 of the BIA is as
follows:
The factors to be considered on an application for leave to appeal are: (a)
whether the point of appeal is of significance to the practice; (b) whether the
point raised is of significance to the action itself; (c) whether the appeal is
prima facie meritorious or, on the other hand, whether it is frivolous; and (d)
whether the appeal will unduly hinder the progress of the action: Power
Consolidated (China) Pulp Inc. v. British Columbia Resources investment Corp.
(1988), 19 C.P.C. (3d) 396 (B.C. C.A.); Med Finance Co. S.A. v. Bank of
Montreal (1993), 22 C.B.R. (3d) 279, 24 B.C.A.C. 318, 40 W.A.C. 318
(C.A.).
Section 193(e) gives a judge of the Court of Appeal a discretion, but leave
should only be granted if the judgment appears to be contrary to law, amounts to
an abuse of judicial power, or involves an obvious error, causing prejudice, for
which there is no remedy: MacNab v. B.S. & B. Enterprises Ltd.
(1951), 32 C.B.R. 53 (Que. K.B.); Re Leard (1994), 25 C.B.R. (3d) 210,
114 D.L.R. (4th) 135 (Ont. C.A.). If the order sought to be appealed from is
discretionary, leave will not be granted unless the matter is of importance
either to the administration of justice generally or to the respective rights of
the parties to litigation: Zurich Indemnity Co. of Canada v. Reemark Rideau
Developments Ltd. (1992), 22 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 283, 18
B.C.A.C. 221, 31 W.A.C. 221 (C.A.).
R.J. Nicol Construction Ltd. (1995) 30 C.B.R. 95 (Ont. C.A.)
West Edmonton Mall Property Inc. v. Duncan & Craig,
[2001] A.J. No. 158 (Alta C.A.) paras. 8-9
(a) The point(s) of the appeal is of significance to the
practice
32. An issue that affects a large number of insolvencies and is not limited
to the case at bar is clearly an issue of significance to the practice. There
are a number of points in this appeal that are of significance to the practice
that affect all insolvencies and bankruptcies where employees are employed to
keep operating the business until it is sold. This is an area of great concern
to employees, labour counsel and should also be to receivers and trustees. Thus
court needs to settle the law and clarify the rules for the practice.
Re Baker (1995) 22 O.R. (3d) 376 (C.A.)
33. First, the current practice that exists in the Ontario Commercial List
is that judges routinely issue lengthy "boiler plates" style orders pre-drafted
by counsel to a secured creditor and receiver or trustee and presented to the
Court on ex parte motions. Such orders are replete with provisions that
suspend the operation of provincial statutes, in particular, statutes whose sole
purpose is to protect employees. The Court in Re Big Sky comprehensively
reviewed precisely such an order and ruled that it contained numerous illegal
and inappropriate provisions (such as those contained in paragraph 15 of the
January 24, 2002 receivership order) and ordered that such provisions be
removed. The Big Sky case is a subject of a front page article in the
Ontario Bar Association's Insolvency News (October 2002). The Ontario
Commercial List has not adopted the decision in Big Sky. Clearly, the
practice of the Ontario Commercial List issuing Orders on ex parte
motions which contains provisions that another Bankruptcy Court has ruled are
illegal and inappropriate is an issue of great importance to the practice upon
which this Court needs to rule.
Re Big Sky Living Inc. (2002) A.J. No. 886 (Alta. Q. B.)
Ontario Bar Association Insolvency News, Volume 18, No. 1 (October
2002)
34. The OLRB in the case at bar also expresses confusion over how Ground,
J. can issue the type of order he did. In referring to the initial receivership
order of Ground, J. of January 24, 2002, the OLRB states:
There is no doubt that the Board has jurisdiction to deal with applications
of the kind before us. . . . The order does not on its face explain, how,
despite what appears to be the Board's exclusive statutory jurisdiction, the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice has the authority to determine that KPMG is
not a successor employer or related employer within the meaning of the Act, or
that the appointment of KPMG as interim receiver does not constitute a sale of
the business of any of the debtors pursuant to the Act.
Decision of the OLRB, August 27, 2002, para. 12, Lewis Affidavit, Tab
"M"
The Cases Dealing with the Status of Collective Agreements in a
bankruptcy are Conflicting, Contradictory and Incorrect.
35. Bankruptcy does not terminate a collective agreement A collective
agreement is a creature of statute, the LRA. It can only be brought to life
under the LRA and similarly can only be terminated under the provisions of the
LRA. Section 58(3) of the LRA states:
Early Termination of Collective Agreements
(3) A collective agreement shall not be terminated by the parties before it
ceases to operate in accordance with its provisions or this Act without the
consent of the Board on the joint applications of the parties.
LRA, ss. 16, 17 and 58(3)
The current confused state of the law on this point does not reflect the
clear provisions of the LRA. Rather the courts have recently held that:
a) bankruptcy terminates collective agreements (St. Mary's Paper
(dissent) 588872 Ontario Limited, Associated Freezers Ltd, infra.)
b) bankruptcy does not terminate collective agreements (Saan Stores, Re
Jeffrey Mines CCAA proceedings, infra);
c) bankruptcy places collective agreements into a state of "suspended
animation" (Re Royal Crest Lifecare, infra).
The confused state of the caselaw originates from the dissent of Abella,
J.A. of this Court in St. Mary's Paper where she stated in one
sentence:
Contracts of employment with employees, including collective agreements,
terminate with bankruptcy.
Re St. Marys Paper Inc. (1994) 26 C.B.R. (3d) 273 (Ont. C.A.) at
291
36. About one year later, Spence, J. in Re 588871 Ontario Ltd.
adopted that single sentence from the dissent of Abella, J.A. in St. Marys
Paper and also wrote that collective agreements terminates on bankruptcy.
Spence, J. went on to say that since the collective agreement terminated would
be inconsistent to grant leave to the union to proceed against the trustee in
bankruptcy before the OLRB for a declaration that the trustee is a successor
employer. He dismissed the motion by the Union for leave to commence such
proceedings.
Re 588871 Ontario Ltd. (1995), 33 C.B.R. (3d) 28 (Ont. Ct. Gen.
Div.)
After Re 588871 Ontario Ltd., the Nova Scotia Supreme Court in
Associated Freezers of Canada Inc. also adopted the dissent of
Abella, J.A. in St. Mary's Paper that bankruptcy terminates a collective
agreement. The decision was upheld in the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal.
Associated Freezers of Canada Inc. (Trustee of) v. Retail,
Wholesale Canada, Local 1015 (1995), 36 C.B.R. (3d) (N.S.C.T.D.), aff'd
(1996), 39 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (N.S.C.A.)
37. However, a soon after Associated Freezers, the Nova Scotia Court
of Appeal again, this time in Saan Stores Ltd., (in dismissing a judicial
review application of a decision of the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board that
found the purchaser of a business out of a bankruptcy to be a successor
employer) overruled the Court's own decision in Associated Freezers on
the point that collective agreements terminate in a bankruptcy. The Court in
Saan states:
. . .
In my opinion, statements in the case law that bankruptcy terminates
employment contracts, including collective agreements are broad and, therefore,
subject to misinterpretation and misapplication when taken out of context. In
my opinion, the statements in the case law stand only for the proposition that
the relationship of the employer and employee is terminated as between the
bankrupt employer and the employees on the bankruptcy of the employer.
A review of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Rizzo and
the majority decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in St. Mary's Paper
has led me to conclude that, although employment is terminated by bankruptcy,
the termination of the employer/employee relationship between the bankrupt and
the employee does not necessarily terminate benefits the terminated employee is
entitled to by reason of statutory schemes. Statutes providing such benefits
are to be given a liberal interpretation so as to achieve their objective.
Applying this reasoning I am of the opinion that the statutory scheme
created by s. 31(1) of the Trade Union Act to protect employees from the
loss of their rights under the collective agreement on the sale of the
employer's business is not rendered inappropriate by reason of the bankruptcy of
the employer.
Saan Stores Limited v. N.S. Labour Relations Board (1999),
172 D.L.R. (4th), at 151
38. In the recent case of Re Royal Crest Lifecare Group, (currently
under appeal in this Court) the caselaw veers off into a third direction.
Farley, J. does not follow St. Mary's, 588871 Ontario Ltd, Associated
Freezers or Saan Stores. Instead he introduces a new concept that a
collective agreement is not terminated in a bankruptcy "but rather it is put
into suspended animation, to be revived, if, as, and when a purchaser
with a personal economic interest in the operation of the business acquires the
business."
Re Royal Crest Lifecare Group (2003), 40 C.B.R. (4th) (Ont. Sup. Ct.
Just.), para. 30
39. The conclusion by Farley, J. in Royal Crest Lifecare that a
collective agreement is put into a state of "suspended animation" in a
bankruptcy is as incorrect as the statements in St. Mary's, 588871
Ontario Ltd and Associated Freezers that a collective agreements
terminates on bankruptcy.
40. In the recent Quebec case of Re Jeffrey Mines the Quebec Court
of Appeal ruled that a collective agreement continues in force and must be
abided by the monitor of a company under CCAA protection who continues to employ
employees to run the business.
Re Syndicat national de l'amiante d'Asbestos inc. v. Jeffrey
Mines Inc. (2003) Carswell Que. 90 (Que. C.A.), paras. 51, 52 and 61
41. That holding in Jeffrey Mines case has prompted Quebec-based
companies, such as Air Canada and Ivaco Ltd., to intentionally select the
Ontario Commercial List as the court of choice to file for CCAA protection in
order to avoid the ruling in Jeffrey Mines that collective agreement must
be abided by if a monitor (or receiver or trustee) continues to employ
employees. It is well acknowledged in the practice that the law in Ontario on
this point is not clear and that the Ontario Commercial List will issue orders
that suspend the application of provincial employment laws to immunize
companies, receivers and trustees from the application of collective agreements
and provincial employment statutes. The law and practice needs to be urgently
reviewed by this Court and settled.
42. Further, the public's perception of the legitimacy and fairness of the
insolvency process would certainly be questioned where employment and labour
statutes, whose purpose is to protect employees, are being suspended by court
orders. The Court should place significant weight upon this factor and for this
reason grant leave to appeal.
43. There is also considerable confusion and ill-founded fear in the
practice about whether a trustee or an interim receiver, if held to be a
successor employer or related employer under the LRA, will become personally
liable for amounts owing to the employees. A trustee or a receiver will not
become personally liable. A finding that a trustee or an interim receiver is a
successor employer by the LRA will give rise to the obligation on that trustee
or interim receiver to abide by the terms of the collective agreement while it
employs employees to continue running the business. and in particular, to
compensate employees in accordance with a collective agreement. This result is
exactly consistent with the ruling of the Quebec Court of Appeal in Re
Jeffrey Mines. A trustee or an interim receiver will not become
personally liable for amounts owing to employees anymore than management of a
company are personally liable for debts of the company.
44. Practically speaking, if an interim receiver or trustee abides by the
terms of a collective agreement while it continues to employ employees to
operate a business, it will not attract an application by a union to have the
interim receiver or trustee declared a successor employer or related employer.
45. The fear that a trustee or an interim receiver would become personally
liable if found to be a successor employer by the OLRB undoubtedly led the court
in 588871 Ontario Ltd. and more recently, Re Royal Crest Lifecare
to justify the issuance of initial orders that state that they are not to be
deemed a successor employer or related employer under the LRA and employment
statutes. This issue also needs to be clarified by this Court in order to
prevent such in terrorem arguments from being successfully used before
Commercial List Judges.
Re 588871 Ontario Ltd., supra, at 33
Royal Crest, supra, para. 26-28
(b) The point(s) raised are of significance to the action
itself
46. There is no doubt that this appeal is significant to the action itself.
The LRA is crystal clear that it has exclusive jurisdiction over matters
involving labour relations. The Union can only apply to the OLRB to have these
matters adjudicated. The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed in Weber that
matters of labour relations should only go before the applicable labour
relations board and not the courts. The proceedings filed by the Union before
the OLRB can only proceed if leave is obtained under the initial receivership
order, which Ground J. refused to grant. The Union has no other remedy with
which to pursue the Interim Receiver for its breaches of the LRA and a
declaration that the Interim Receiver is a successor employer other than to
apply to the OLRB. If leave is not obtained from this Court, the result will be
that the Interim Receiver will have committed clear contraventions of ss. 70, 72
and 79 of the LRA without any consequence or penalty.
Weber v. Ontario Hydro (1995), 125 D.L.R. (4th)
583 (S.C.C.)
(c) The appeal is prima facie meritorious
47. The appeal to this Court requests that this Court overturn the decision
of Ground, J. of April 24, 2003 and grant leave to the Union to continue its
proceedings before the OLRB against the Interim Receiver for breaches of ss. 70,
72 and 79 of the LRA (unfair labour practices) and a declaration that the
interim receiver is a "successor employer" or a "related employer" and thus
bound by the terms of the Collective Agreement. The decision of Ground J. in
failing to even consider the applicable tests for leave, as set out in
prior decisions of this Court, is already enough to demonstrate that the appeal
is meritorious.
48. The appeal to this Court also asks that this Court grant the leave that
was initially requested by the Union in the motion before Ground, J. The test
for granting leave under a receivership order to take proceedings against an
interim receiver, (such as the January 24 receivership Order), is that the court
will grant leave unless the action is frivolous or vexatious. The test is not
onerous and is designed to protect an interim revive r from frivolous or
vexatious actions only. It is not to stop meritorious actions against an interim
receiver from proceeding or to allow an interim receiver to breach provincial
employment statutes with impunity. The facts of the case at bar clearly
establish a prima facie case against the interim receiver. The case against the
interim receiver is definitely neither frivolous nor vexatious. The appeal is
entirely meritorious.
Gallo v. Beber (1981), 31 C.P.C. (4th) 60 (Ont. C.A.),
para. 7
RoyNat Inc. v. Allan (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Alta.
Q.B.)
49. Further, the Court will be even more inclined grant leave to take
proceedings against an interim receiver when the matter relates specifically to
employees and collective bargaining, as is the case here.
I.W.A., Local 1-324 v. Wescana Inn Ltd. (1977), 82 D.L.R.
(3d) 368 (Man. C.A.), para. 26
50. The test for leave under section 215 of the BIA is nearly identical to
the test for leave under a receivership order. A court will grant leave to take
proceedings against a trustee in bankruptcy where the proceedings are not
frivolous or vexatious and there is some factual foundation for the claim.
Again, the test is not onerous and readily met in this case.
Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v.
Armitage (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 388 (Ont. C.A.), para. 2
Mancini (Trustee of) v. Falconi (1993), 61 O.A.C. 332 (Ont.
C.A.), para. 7
51. Once this matter can proceed before the OLRB, the Union's case is
entirely meritorious there as well. The OLRB has held that a plant relocation
to a jurisdiction outside the geographic scope of the Collective Agreement and
where the same clientele is being served constitutes an unfair labour practice
under the LRA.
Adams, G. Canadian Labour Law (2 ed.), (loose-leaf, November,
2003)
United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, Local 504
v.
Westinghouse Canada Ltd., 80 C.L.L.C. 16, 053 (Ont. Div. Ct.)
Humpty Dumpty Goods Ltd. 78 C.L.L.C. 16, 136 (O.L.R.B.)
52. Labour boards have in numerous cases recognized a court-appointed
receiver as a successor employer under labour standards legislation.
H&S Reliance Ltd., [1998] O.L.R.D. No. 4087
Re Wilson Place Management Ltd., [1997] B.C.L.R.B. No. 397
Vulcan Containers Ltd., [1997] O.R.L.D. No. 2662 (O.L.R.B.)
National Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers' Union
of Canada (CAW-CANADA) Local 2171, and Imperial Optical Company Limited and Peat
Marwick Thorne Inc. (1994), B.C.L.R.B. No. B148/94
Weldco-Beales and Peat Marwick Thorne Inc. and International Union of
Operating Engineers, Local 115 (May 24, 1991), No. C103/91
(B.C.I.R.C.)
12403 Holdings Ltd. (Northern Park Inn) Campbell, Saunders Ltd. and
Hotel, Restaurant & Culinary Employees and Bartenders Union, Local 40,
(January 25, 1998), No. C24/88 (B.C.I.R.C.)
RASL Ventures Ltd. and 289133 B.C. Ltd. c.o.b. as the Chetwynd Hotel
(1986) B.C.L.R.B. No. 209/87
Maritime Life Assurance Co. v. Chateau Gardens (Hanover) Inc. et
al, (1983), 2 D.L.R. (4th) 553 (Ont. H.C.J.)
(d) The Appeal will not unduly hinder the progress of
action
53. The appeal will not unduly hinder progress of the action at all. There
is no claims process for unsecured creditors, not will there be one due to the
amounts owed by T.C.T. to the secured creditor, GMAC. The Union does not seek
an order to set aside the sale of T.C.T. Warehousing by the Interim
Receiver/Trustee to Spectrum. The appeal relates to the treatment of the Union
representing employees of T.C.T. Warehousing by the Interim Receiver/Trustee,
the failure of the Interim Receiver/Trustee to abide by the terms of the
Collective Agreement and the manipulation of the sale of the warehousing
business to eliminate the Union for which damages are sought.. The liquidation
of the T.C.T. group of companies can certainly continue without any undue
hindrance if this appeal proceeds.
Additional Factors
(e) The reasons of Ground, J. are contrary to law
54. The Court will also consider if the decision at issue in the appeal is
contrary to law. The decision of Ground, J. falls easily within this
requirement. In the case of West Edmonton Mall, the Alberta Court of
Appeal granted leave to appeal under this test on the basis that the master "may
have erred" in his application of a statute.
West Edmonton Mall, supra, para. 12
55. First, in upholding paragraph 15 of his order that the Interim
Receiver/Trustee was not to be deemed a "successor employer" or "related
employer" under the LRA and other employment statutes and refusing to grant
leave, Ground, J.'s decision contravenes section 116 of the LRA and is thus
contrary to law. Section 116 expressly bars a court from issuing any
order that prohibits or restrains the activities of the OLRB:
116. No decision, order, direction, declaration or ruling of the
Board shall be questioned or reviewed in any court, and no order shall be
made or process entered, or proceedings taken in any court, whether by way
of injunction, declaratory judgment, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto, or otherwise in question, review, prohibit or restrain the Board or
any of its proceedings.
(Emphasis added)
LRA, ss. 114, 116
56. The Supreme Court of Canada made it clear in Weber that the
courts do not have jurisdiction over disputes whose essential character arise
from a collective agreement, as is the case here. In ordering that the Interim
Receiver was not a successor employer under the LRA, Ground, J. acted beyond the
court's jurisdiction and decided the issue himself, which the Supreme Court has
held a court cannot do.
Weber v. Ontario Hydro, supra.
57. Second, Ground, J. went far beyond the provisions of sections 47 of the
BIA and section 101 of the CJA, the sections that authorize a court to appoint
an interim receiver.
58. There is no authority under section 47 of the BIA to permit a court to
issue an order declaring that an interim receiver is not a successor employer
under the LRA. The language of section 47 of the BIA is clear and only
authorizes a court to issue an order to appoint an interim receiver and
direct an interim receiver to do certain things. It does not authorize a
Court to order that an interim receiver is not to be deemed a successor employer
or related employer under the LRA and labour statutes while it continues to
employee employees to continue operating the business. If Parliament wished to
give the court the power to issue such an order, it could easily have inserted
such language into s. 47 of the BIA. Parliament did not.
BIA, s. 47
59. Further, there is no suggestion that Parliament ever intended to grant
the court any such authority, particularly considering that in other places, the
BIA expressly exempts a trustee and an interim receiver from environmental
statutes. There is no similar exemption for employment statutes. The
conclusion is clear that the Parliament intended for employment statutes to
continue to apply and operate in receivership or bankruptcy proceedings.
BIA, ss. 14.06(1.2), 47
60. Similarly, there is nothing in section 101 of the Courts of Justice
Act to authorise or even suggest that a court has the power to issue an
order that an interim receiver shall not be deemed to be a successor employer or
related employer under labour and employment statutes.
CJA, s. 101
61. The Court in Big Sky held that an order appointing an interim
receiver should only include provisions that are necessary to appoint the
receiver and to enable it to accomplish its tasks of preserving and protecting
the assets of the debtor. Provisions such as those contained in paragraph 15 of
the initial receivership order are contrary to law and have no place in an
initial receivership order.
Re Big Sky, supra
62. Further, it is settled law that a court cannot relay on inherent
jurisdiction to issue an order that contravenes statute law.
Baxter Student Housing Ltd. v. College Housing Cooperative Ltd.,
[1975] 57 D.L.R. (3d) (S.C.C.), at p. 4
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wildflower Productions Inc.
(2001) 197 D.L.R. (4th) 92 (B.C.C.A.)
63. Accordingly, there is absolutely no legal basis for Ground, J.'s
decision to maintain paragraph 15 in the initial receivership order. The
Reasons of Ground, J. are contrary to law in numerous places. Leave to appeal to
this Court should be granted on this ground alone.
(f) The reasons of Ground, J. are an abuse of judicial
power
64. Another factor that the Court will consider in deciding whether to
grant leave to appeal is whether the decision constitutes an abuse of judicial
power. The decision of Ground, J. meets this test.
65. In refusing to delete paragraph 15 of the Receivership Order, Ground J.
intentionally immunizes the interim receiver from the application of the LRA,
the Employment Standards Act, 2000 and the Pension Benefits Act as
well as from proceedings before the OLRB and the Financial Services Commission
of Ontario. The decision prohibits employees from enforcing their rights before
the OLRB (or FSCO) for breaches of said employment statutes committed by the
interim receiver. Without any legislative authority (as is the case here), such
intentional immunization is an abuse of judicial power.
66. With respect, the disregard of provincial statute law should be of
serious concern to this Court. A court should not be permitted to override
statutes, which are an expression of legislative will, without specific
jurisdiction to do so. This concern is heightened considering that the clear
legislative purpose of such employment statutes is to protect employees.
(g) The reasons of Ground, J. involve an obvious
error(s)
67. The Court will also examine whether or not the decision involves an
obvious error for which there is no other remedy. Ground, J. made a number of
obvious errors which cause serious prejudice to the Union and for which there is
no other remedy but to appeal to this Court.
68. In addition to Ground, J.'s incorrect reliance on section 47 of the
BIA, section 101 of the CJA and his disregard of section 116 of the LRA - which
in and of themselves constitute serious and obvious errors - Ground, J. also
made a number of additional obvious errors.
69. Ground, J. did not even consider granting leave in respect of the
breaches of ss. 70, 72 and 79 of the LRA (unfair labour practices) by the
interim receiver or the applications filed for a declaration that the interim
receiver/trustee was a "related employer" under s. 1(4) of the LRA, which were
part of the relief requested in the Union's motion. Instead, Ground, J. focussed
entirely on the "successor employer" aspect. Failing to deal with other specific
request for relief, which in and of itself would have justified granting leave,
is an obvious error warranting appellate review.
70. Ground, J. also misapplied the "ancillary" and "necessarily incidental"
doctrines of constitutional law to conclude that he has jurisdiction under
section 47 of the BIA to issue an Order that that includes a provision that an
interim receiver is not a successor employer. These doctrines are used in the
analysis of the constitutionality of an impugned law, or aspect of a law,
where a reviewing court must measure the degree of encroachment a legislative
scheme has on the other government's sphere of power, and then determine how
necessary the impugned provision is to the otherwise valid legislative scheme.
Hogg, P.W., Constitutional Law of Canada, Vol. 1, at pp. 15-35,
15-40
71. These constitutional law doctrines are applicable to an impugned
statute or regulation, not a court order. Ground, J. made a serious error in
reviewing his own court order in the context of these constitutional law
doctrines and concluding in his order that an interim receiver is not a
successor employer under the LRA is "necessarily incidental" to an interim
receiver performing its functions in realising the debtor's assets. The
reliance on these constitutional law doctrines is completely misplaced and
cannot be relied on to permit the Court to neutralize the entire fabric of
employment and labour statutes in insolvency proceedings.
72. Second, Ground, J. also made an obvious error in failing to even
consider the applicable tests for leave which are clearly set out in the
caselaw. The Union would have readily have met the tests for leave had they
been granted.
73. There is no other remedy for these errors other than to appeal to this
court to set aside the decision of Ground, J. The Order of Ground, J.
completely shuts down the application of employment and labour statutes and
immunizes the Interim Receiver/Trustee from being called to task for its
breaches of the LRA.
74. This is an area where the law is in a confused and unsettled and
urgently needs to be clarified by this Court. The decision of Ground, J. is
contrary to law, an abuse of judicial power and involves obvious errors for
which there is no other remedy to the Union. Leave to appeal to this court
should be granted.
PART IV
- ORDER REQUESTED
75. The Union respectfully requests that leave to appeal from the Order of
Ground, J. dated April 29, 2003 to this Court be granted.
76. The Union requests its costs of this motion on a substantial indemnity
scale.
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
December 8, 2003 KOSKIE MINSKY
Barristers & Solicitors
20
Queen Street West, Suite 900, Box 52
Toronto, ON M5H 3R3
_____________________________
Stephen Wahl (LSUC#:
17201O)
_____________________________
Andrew J. Hatnay (LSUC#: 31885W)
Tel: 416-977-8353
Fax: 416-977-3316
Counsel to the Union (Appellant)
SCHEDULE
“A”
LIST OF AUTHORITIES
1. R.J. Nicol Construction Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Nicol, [1995]
O.J. No. 48 (Ont. C.A.)
2. West Edmonton Mall Property Inc. v.
Duncan & Craig, [2001] A.J.
No. 158 (Alta. C.A.)
3. Baker
(Re) (1995), 22 O.R. (3d) 376 (Ont. C.A.)
4. Re Big Sky Living
Inc., [2002] Carswell Alta. 875 (Alta. Q.B.)
5. Ontario Bar
Association Insolvency News, Volume 18, No. 1 (October,
2002)
6. Re St. Marys Paper Inc. (1994), 26 C.B.R. (3d) 273 (Ont.
C.A.)
7. Re 588871 Ontario Ltd. (1995), 33 C.B.R. (3d) 28 (Ont.
Ct. Gen. Div.)
8. Associated Freezers of Canada Inc. (Trustee of)
v. Retail, Wholesale Canada,
Local 1015 (1995), 36 C.B.R. (3d)
(N.S.C.T.D.), aff'd (1996), 39 C.B.R.
(3d) 311 (N.S.C.A.)
9. Saan
Stores Limited v. N.S. Labour Relations Board (1999), 172 D.L.R.
(4th)
10. Re Royal Crest Lifecare Group (2003), 40 C.B.R. (4th)
(Ont.S.C.J.)
11. Re Syndicat national de l'amiante d'Asbestos
inc. v. Jeffrey Mines Inc. (2003),
Carswell Que. 90 (Que.
C.A.)
12. Weber v. Ontario Hydro (1995), 125 D.L.R. (4th)
583 (S.C.C.)
13. Gallo v. Beber (1981), 31 C.P.C. (4th) 60
(Ont. C.A.)
14. RoyNat Inc. v. Allan (1988), 69 C.B.R.
(N.S.) 245 (Alta. Q.B.)
15. I.W.A., Local 1-324 v. Wescana Inn
Ltd. (1977), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 368 (Man. C.A.)
16. Society of
Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Armitage
(2000),
50 O.R. (3d) 388 (Ont. C.A.)
17. Mancini (Trustee of)
v. Falconi (1993), 61 O.A.C. 332 (Ont. C.A.)
18. Adams, G.
Canadian Labour Law (2ed), (loose-leaf, November,
2003)
19. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America,
Local 504 v.
Westinghouse Canada Ltd., 80 C.L.L.C. 16, 053 (Ont.
Div. Ct.)
20. Humpty Dumpty Goods Ltd., 78 C.L.L.C. 16, 136
(O.L.R.B.)
21. H&S Reliance Ltd., [1998] O.L.R.D. No.
4087
22. Re Wilson Place Management Ltd., [1997] B.C.L.R.B. No.
397
23. Vulcan Containers Ltd., [1997] O.R.L.D. No.
2662
24. National Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers' Union of
Canada (CAW-CANADA) Local 2171, and Imperial Optical
Company Limited and
Peat Marwick Thorne Inc. (1994), B.C.L.R.B.
No. B148/94
25. Weldco-Beales and Peat Marwick Thorne Inc. and
International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local 115 (May 24, 1991), No. C103/91
(B.C.I.R.C.)
26. 12403 Holdings Ltd. (Northern Park Inn) Campbell,
Saunders Ltd. and Hotel,
Restaurant & Culinary Employees and
Bartenders Union, Local 40,
(January 25, 1998), No. C24/88
(B.C.I.R.C.)
27. RASL Ventures Ltd. and 289133 B.C. Ltd. c.o.b. as
the Chetwynd Hotel (1986)
B.C.L.R.B. No. 209/87
28. Maritime
Life Assurance Co. v. Chateau Gardens (Hanover) Inc. et al,
(1983),
2 D.L.R. (4th) 553 (Ont. H.C.J.)
29. Baxter Student Housing
Ltd. v. College Housing Cooperative Ltd., [1975]
57 D.L.R. (3d)
(S.C.C.)
30. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wildflower
Productions Inc. (2001),
197 D.L.R. (4th) 92 (B.C.C.A.)
31. Hogg,
P.W., Constitutional Law of Canada, Vol. 1
32. Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, ss. 47, 14.06, 193 and
215
33. Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Ontario), S.O. 1995,
c.1
34. Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s.
101(1)
SCHEDULE “B”
LIST OF
STATUTES
1. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, ss. 47,
14.06, 193 and 215;
2. Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Ontario), S.O. 1995, c. 1;
3. Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 101(1).
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